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Report date: 07/12/2019 Accident number: 824
Accident time: 07:19 Accident Date: 01/07/2009




Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?)
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 01/07/2009
ID original source: 03/2009 Name of source: LMAC RMAC-
Nabatiyah
Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: Submunition Ground condition: agricultural
(abandoned); hard;
rocks/stones
Date record created: Date last modified: 07/12/2019
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1
Map details
Longitude: Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: UTM 36S 0734957 -
688412
Coordinates fixed by:
Map east: Map north:








A report of this accident was made available by the national mine action authority in 2019.
Some of the original formatting has been removed but the original report is held on file. The
substance of the report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. Text in square brackets [ ]
is editorial.
REGIONAL MINE ACTION CENTRE (RMAC) SOUTH LEBANON
Ref No. 03/2009
BOARD OF INQUIRY (BOI) INVESTIGATION REPORT
Report Category: Accident: BAC, SUBMUNITION
Cause: Uncontrolled detonation of mine/UXO by: Human
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Report Compiled By: [Name removed], QA Officer, RMAC-Nabatiyeh and [Name removed],
QA Officer
Location: Nabatiyeh, Lebanon Date: 1 July 2009
Casualty(s): Human
Agency Involved: [International demining organisation]
Annexes [Not made available]
A Area Map – location of CBU-681
B RMAC BOI Witness Statements
C [International demining organisation] Demining Accident Report
D IMSMA Demining Accident Report (Pending)
E IMSMA Casualty Report
F IMSMA DA Report
G Medical report
1. Introduction
In accordance with the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG), the RMAC
Programme Manager, [Name removed], issued a Verbal Convening Order on Wednesday the
1st of July 2009, for an accident investigation Board of Inquiry (BOI). The Board members are
[Name removed] RMAC QA Officer and [Name removed] RMAC QA Officer.
This is a comprehensive report by the Board of Inquiry (BOI) team into the [International
demining organisation] BAC Accident that occurred on 1st July 2009 which is based on the
RMAC investigation, statements from [International demining organisation] personnel involved
in the accident and evidence from the accident site.
The accident occurred at 0719hrs (local time) on the 1st July 2009 in Area 6-005
CBU 681 UTM 36S 0734957 – 688412, which is situated near the village of Yohmor.
The BOI is an impartial investigation conducted by the RMAC on behalf of the Lebanon Mine
Action Center (LMAC) Lebanon. The primary objective of the BOI is to examine evidence in
order to conclude the cause of the accident and make recommendations for the prevention of
further accidents.
2. Executive Summary
On 1st July 2009 at [International demining organisation] BAC Task CBU-681, a detonation of
a US M series submunition occurred while [the Victim] an [International demining
organisation] Searcher ID No. LS 444 was conducting subsurface search and excavating the
signals. [The Victim] sustained injuries in his left arm, little finger.
Based on all available evidence, the BOI team concludes that the immediate response to the
accident by the team leader and the treatment by the medic enabled an effective casevac and
subsequent medevac from the task to Najdeh hospital in Nabatiyeh. Supervised by both the
TFM and Site Supervisor.
There is no conclusive evidence to suggest that incorrect procedures contributed to the
accident and it is therefore concluded that [the Victim] was working in accordance with
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[International demining organisation] Lebanon SOP BAC 09.11 and National Technical
Standards and Guidelines (NTSG) at that time.
The RMAC BOI investigation team consider that it is conclusive that the accident was
unpreventable.
3. Location of Accident / Incident
Task No / Team No: Area 6-005, CBU 68: MAT 3
Yohmor Village, Nabatiyeh District, South Lebanon
Grid Ref / UTM: 734897-3688249 (Accident Site)
Map Ref: LAF Youhmo: version: 2009.
4. Date and Time of Accident / Incident: 1st July 2009, 0719hrs (local time).
5. Reported By: [International demining organisation], [Name removed], Security
Coordinator.
6. Reported To: RMAC, [Name removed], Radio Operator.
7. Person(s) Involved: [the Victim], [International demining organisation] Searcher MAT 3, ID
Number; LS 444.
8. Vehicle(s) or Machine(s) Involved: none.
9. Investigation Team: [Name removed], RMAC QA Officer; [Name removed], RMAC QA
Officer.
10. Location of Investigation: Area 6-005, Yohmor Village, Nabatiyeh District, South
Lebanon. Grid Ref / UTM: 734897-3688249 (Accident Site); Map Ref: LAF Youhmo: version:
2009
11. Date and Time of Investigation: 1st July 2009, 0900hrs (local time)
12. Execution of Investigation
Approach to Site
The accident site is located at IMSMA Task number CBU 681 which is approximately 6 Km
North of Nabatiyeh. The RMAC investigation team drove to the accident site from the RMAC
Base. The task is situated in the middle of Yohmor village. The CP is in a house inside
Yohmor village and away approximately 300m from the site. The RMAC BOI personnel




The ground is rocky and covered with vegetation, the area consist olive terraces from the
road to the accident site. The accident place is 64m away from the road. It was marked with
red topped wooden sticks; these were replaced after the accident. Red/white mine tape had




Crater: There is evidence of a crater around 35cm across and 10cm deep, and explosive
residue caused by an explosive device.
Vegetation: The majority of grass and bushes have been cut within the cleared area.
According to the [International demining organisation] Team Leader this had been conducted
by [International demining organisation] during the clearance procedure. There are piles of
recently cut vegetation within the cleared area.
13.2 Vehicle(s) and Equipment
Ambulance: One ambulance and medic were located at CBU-681 CP at the time of the
accident.
Detector: Minelab F1 A4 Detectors had been used to assist with the subsurface BAC
procedure. The detector had no direct connection with the accident.
Demining Tools: Vegetation cutting / removal tools (shears), prodder and small shovel had
been used during the subsurface BAC process. The prodder had a direct connection with the
accident.
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): According to information gained during the interview
process, [the Victim] had been wearing his PPE (helmet / visor and body armour) prior to the
accident.
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Ballistic Helmet / Visor: There is one partial penetration to the light-weight demining visor
which can be attributed to the effects of an explosion and there’s some minor scratches on
the visor lens caused from dust and small rocks due to the explosion.
Ballistic Body Armour: The body armour is a one-piece ‘jacket style’ design and provides
protection for the vital organs (chest region) and a flap to protection the groin region. There is
one evidence of damage from the effects of an explosion. [Picture showing the lightly
damaged cover of the body armour removed.]
13.3 Explosive Ordnance: The IMSMA Dangerous Area report for CBU-681 details that in
Sep 2006 the LAF disposed of 211 submunitions in-situ. [International demining organisation]
has located 147 US M77 and 6 US M42 (dual purpose anti-armour / anti-personnel)
submunitions at CBU-681 to date. See Annex D –IMSMA DA Report. [Annexes not made
available.]
13.4 Casualty(s) (position, clothing)
Casualty’s Position: According to witness statements [the Victim] was on his knees when
the detonation occurred. The injuries sustained are consistent with all witness statements.
Casualty’s Clothing: Damage to the left hand glove.
13.5 Interviews:
The following [International demining organisation] personnel were interviewed in this
sequence by the RMAC BOI team on 1st July 2009 at CBU-681. See Annex B – Witness
Statements [not made available].
[Name removed], Site supervisor
[Name removed], Medic MAT 3, LS 455
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[Name removed], Driver, LS 485
[Name removed], Searcher, LS 444
14. Casualty Information
The following information regarding [the Victim]’s injuries was obtained by the BOI team
during the interview process at the accident site: Medic’s diagnosis at accident site 1st July
2009: Left arm. Broken finger in third bottom section of left phalanx in left hand.
The following information regarding [the Victim]’s injuries was obtained from the medical
report by Dr. [Name removed] submitted by [International demining organisation] on 1st July
2009. (See Annex I - medical report [not made available]).
15. Incident Details (Circumstances / Sequence of Events)
The following information is based on an assessment of the evidence obtained by the RMAC
BOI team at the accident site and from witness statements:
On 1st July 2009 at 719hrs, [the Victim], a [International demining organisation] BAC
Searcher was involved in a BAC Accident at [International demining organisation] Task CBU
681 which resulted in injuries to his left hand small finger. The accident was reported by the
[International demining organisation] headquarters in Nabatiyeh to the RMAC Operations in
Nabatiyeh by Radio/Telephone/fax.
At 0700 hrs, RMAC Operations in Nabatiyeh received a radio call from [International demining
organisation] Operations, informing them that operations had commenced operations at CBU-
681.
[The Victim] BAC Searcher was conducting subsurface search. After marking the signals he
started to excavate; at 7:19 ,while he was using the prodder for excavation a detonation
occurred.
The team leader stopped all work immediately and controlled the medical evacuation of [the
Victim]. All [International demining organisation] teams stopped operation.
Immediately after the accident, [Name removed] (RMAC QA Officer) was informed about the
accident at CBU 681 by the RMAC Chief of Operations. At 0900hrs [Name removed] arrived
at CBU681.
Chronology of Events (According to witness statements and RMAC radio log)
1st July 2009
0700 MAT 3 commenced operations at CBU 681.
0719 Accident occurred.
0735 Ambulance departed CBU 681 with [the Victim] to Najdeh hospital in Nabatiyeh.
0746 Ambulance arrived at Najdeh hospital.
0900 [Name removed] (RMAC QA Officer) and [Name removed] (QA officer) arrived at
CBU 681.
1031 BOI investigation team left CBU 681 to [International demining organisation] base
Nabatiyeh.
1049 BOI investigation team arrived at [International demining organisation] base to see
the casualty after he finished from the hospital.
1120 [the BOI investigators] departed from [International demining organisation] base to
RMAC Nabatiyeh.
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15.1 Medical Assistance and Evacuation (procedure, treatment, equip.)
On 1st July 2009, there was one medic [Name removed] at task CBU-681 who was
positioned with the ambulance and driver at the control point during clearance operations.
After hearing the explosion the medic immediately called the team leader by radio in order to
ascertain what had occurred and after being requested to do so, went with the ambulance to
the designated medical point.
The initial casualty report was completed on site.
The team leader reported the accident to the [International demining organisation] HQ
immediately after the accident had occurred.
According to statements from [International demining organisation] personnel, from the time
of the accident to the evacuation of the casualty from the task took 16 minutes and the
ambulance arrived at Najdeh hospital 11 minutes later. Therefore, a total time of 27 minutes
had elapsed from the time of the accident to the casualty’s arrival at hospital.
15.2 Geography and Climate
Task CBU 681 is located in a mountainous region in the village of Yohmor and 10 km South
of Nabatiyeh. The task is within housing comprising rocky and sparse vegetation and there is
evidence of cultivation (harvesting, vegetation removal and irrigation) by the local population
on the olive groves. The immediate area of the accident is on a olive terraces, comprising
rocky earth and vegetation. At the time of the accident the weather was sunny and the
visibility was clear.
15.3 Demining Procedures
The team was conducting subsurface operations using sub surface BAC procedures. Minelab
F1 A4 detectors had been used at the task. The vegetation in the cleared area was comprised
of bushes and grass had been cut by [International demining organisation] during clearance.
Based on the evidence gathered during the investigation and the results of an external QA
inspection performed by a RMAC QA Officer previously, subsurface BAC procedures were
being conducted in accordance to the [International demining organisation] SOP and the
NTSG for Lebanon.
15.4 Demining Equipment: IAW [International demining organisation] SOPs and NTSGs
15.5 Communications
VHF radios are used to communicate within the task. On 1st July 2009 there were hand-held
radios at the task and a vehicle set in the ambulance. In addition the team leader and TFM
had mobile phones: however, these were not required as there was full radio network
coverage.
15.6 Site Layout and Marking
The control point was clearly marked; the accident place was marked with red topped wooden
sticks; these were replaced after the accident. Red/white mine tape had been attached to
these pickets; marking is in accordance with [International demining organisation] SOP 08.40.
15.7 Command and Control: The [International demining organisation] team composition
was in accordance to their SOP, both internal and external QA reports indicate good
command & control at all levels.
15.8 Quality Assurance and Quality Control
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External QA: Between the period 15th January 2009 and 1st July 2009, a total of 13 external
RMAC QA inspections were conducted at CBU-681. The overall conclusion of the reports was
Acceptable.
16 Details of Non Compliance to Agency SOP / NTSG / IMAS: The Demining operations
(surface & sub surface BAC) at CBU-681 are in compliance to the [International demining
organisation] SOP, NTSG and IMAS.
17 Task Status: Current. Start Date (14/08/ 2008)
18 Background Information
CBU 681 is one of a number of CBU tasks within task dossier 6-005 issued to [International
demining organisation] by the MACC SL in 2008 and then reissued by RMAC in 2009. In the
last three days of the war in 2006, submunitions were dispensed into the area by Israeli
rockets. The Dangerous Area report details that the LAF destroyed 211 submunitions in the
area (See Annex D – IMSMA DA Report). MAT 16 and MAT 3 was tasked by [International
demining organisation] to conduct surface and subsurface clearance at CBU-681 using
surface BAC procedures.
19 Conclusions
a. A detonation of a US submunition (M Series) dual purpose occurred while [the Victim]
was doing subsurface search and excavating the signal after 19 min from the
beginning of operations.
b. The submunition was partially exploded and the remains of the shape charge was
one meter away from the place of detonation.
c. From the injuries of [the Victim] and his statement, and from the evidence on the
PPE, [the Victim] was kneeling on the ground while the tool hit the mechanism of the
submunition.
d. The evidence from interviews conducted during the investigation indicate that [the
Victim] was wearing full PPE (helmet / visor and body armour) at the time of the
accident and there is no evidence to contradict this or that he was not wearing it
correctly. The nature of his injuries and condition of the PPE shows that he was
wearing full PPE.
e. It is of the BOI team’s opinion that the command and control during the clearance
operations at CBU-681 was according to the [International demining organisation]
SOP and NTSG.
f. From information gathered during the interview process it can be concluded that
communications from the task to the [International demining organisation] HQ was
reliable at that time.
g. The task was marked in accordance with [International demining organisation]
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 09.11.45 and in compliance to the NTSG
Chapter 03 Mine Clearance and Battle Area Clearance Marking Systems.
h. Based on all available evidence, the BOI team concludes that the immediate
response to the accident by the team leader and the treatment by the medic enabled
an effective casevac and subsequent medevac from the task to Najdeh hospital in
Nabatiyeh.
i. During the course of the investigation the RMAC BOI team received full cooperation
from [International demining organisation].
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j. The accident is considered to be conclusive as unpreventable.
20 Further Actions and Recommendations
a. [International demining organisation] temporarily suspended all BAC operations and
conducted two days refresher training before resuming operations on CBU-681.
(Done the day right after the accident and the day after).
b. In case of facing hard ground, SS/TL to make sure that the searchers are using water
to facilitate their excavation.
Report Written By: [Name removed] and [Name removed], RMAC QA Officers, LAF RMAC
1. Comments by the RMAC Chief of QA, [Name removed], RMAC Chief QA, LAF
2. Comments by RMAC Chief of OPS, [Name removed], RMAC Chief OPS, LAF
3. Comments by the RMAC Program Manager, [Name removed], RMAC Program Manager,
LAF.
Victim Report
Victim number: 1042 Name: [Name removed]
Age: Gender: Male
Status: deminer Fit for work: presumed
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 27 minutes
Protection issued: Vest
Long visor
Protection used: Vest, Long visor
Summary of injuries: severe Finger
COMMENT: No medical report was made available. The Victim was in hospital less than
three hours so it is presumed that the injuries were not extensive.
Analysis
The primary and secondary causes of this accident are listed as ‘Unavoidable’ because the
investigators found nothing wrong with the procedures being used at the time. There was
evidence that the PPE was being used correctly. The fact that the submunition detonated
implies that the excavation may have been conducted without due caution, but there is no
direct evidence of that. The light injuries that resulted imply that the unidentified submunition
may have been deeply concealed with most of the fragments and the shaped charge directed
away from the Victim, but may have been because the Victim was lucky and the munition did
not detonate fully. The submunition involved was reported to have been ‘partly exploded’ with
its ‘remains’ a meter away from the accident site. No photographs of this (which may have led
to a positive ID of the munition involved) were included in the report.
There is a common misconception that the expensive helmet and visor that was used offers
‘ballistic’ protection. The helmet to which the visor was attached is not ‘ballistic’ and is not
designed to offer any significant protection in the event of an explosive accident. The 5mm
polycarbonate visor is intended to offer significant protection against blast and some
protection against fragmentation. The helmet merely holds the visor in place.
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The inadequate equipment referenced in the Notes refers to the prodder, which appears to
have been a wooden handled mild-steel screwdriver. These are not designed to be blast
resistant or to serve as PPE (as recommended in the IMAS). They are also not a suitable tool
to allow efficient and safe excavation of hazards. However, they had presumably been
detailed in the organisation’s SOPs which the MAC had approved for use at the time.
